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WHITHER AFRICA’S CIVIL SOCIETY?  
 
 Paul Opoku-Mensah 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From relative obscurity, civil society emerged as one of the most salient 
theoretical and policy concepts in African development expected to reconstitute 
the state and to contribute to development and democratisation objectives. This 
growing importance is premised on normative expectations that civil society has 
the potential to provide the missing key, at both theoretical and policy levels, to 
sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved 
governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and 
prevention of the kind of political decay that had undermined African 
development.1 
 
Yet nearly two decades after it emerged as a central object of theoretical and 
policy analyses in Africa, the contours of civil society and its contributions to 
African development and governance, are very little known, in part because of a 
lack of sustained systematic comparative analyses. This has prevented the 
sustained debate that is essential for a realistic understanding of civil society’s 
place in Africa.  
 
This paper seeks to contribute to this need for an understanding of the nature of 
civil society and its potential to the project of a renascent Africa. It draws on 
findings from the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) assessment exercise in 
four African countries—Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda to provide 
insights into the state of civil society in Africa2.  The analyses draw extensively 
from the CSI Country Reports, the CSI Global Report (Vol.1) and the CSI 
international database. In addition it uses insight from the analytical literature 
on civil society in Africa. Three questions, drawn from the CSI findings, frame 
the analyses in the paper:   
 
• First, what are the main similarities found by the CSI in the countries 
regarding civil society’s structure, environment, values and impact, as well 
as strengths, weaknesses and challenges? 
• Second, what are the main differences? 
• Third, what can explain these similarities and what c n explain these 
differences? 
• Finally, on the basis of the above, what is the future of civil society in 
Africa? 
 
 2 
It needs to be emphasised from the outset that Africa is diverse in political, 
socio-economic, and cultural terms, thus presenting methodological problems 
related to the extent to which findings from four countries-- Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, Togo and Uganda—can be generalized. Yet this caution, while relevant, 
ought to be tempered by the similarity that largely cuts across the sub-continent, 
as Lipton argued nearly two decades ago:   
 
The persistence of generalizations about Africa - by Africans as well as 
foreigners; among the wise as well as the foolish; ...strongly suggests that 
there is some set of ‘African’ experiences, problems or opportunities that it is 
worth generalizing about3  
 
Certainly the fragile socio economic and political ontext in which civil society 
operates, and which characterise these four countries, is one of such similarities. 
Beyond the similarities, the four countries also exhibit important variations, as 
they represent “different Africas” including Anglophone (Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda) and Francophone (Togo); as well as different political trajectories, 
namely relatively peaceful democracies making progress on several fronts 
(Ghana and Uganda); fragile and somewhat  autocratic states with  limited  
progress in re-establishing a constitutional democracy (Togo); and states in 
which stabilization and reconstruction are paramount (Sierra Leone).  In effect, 
despite the legitimate methodological concerns, these four countries do provide 
the basis for a much needed discussion on the state of civil society in Africa.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section two 
provides a brief historiography of civil society in Africa. This is followed by 
analyses of the state of civil society in Africa based on the CSI results. This is 
structured around the three issues of the similarities, differences, and what 
accounts for these differences. The next section examines the implications of the 
CSI Findings for civil society in Africa. This is followed by the concluding 
section which brings the findings together.  
 
 
II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA: A REALITY SUI GENERIS  
A decade ago, a vibrant debate that sought to question the relevance and 
appropriateness of civil society to the African context raged on. While details 
and emphasis varied among different authors, in general the debate focused on a 
number of issues including the ‘foreignness’ of the concept and its imposition by 
external actors—donors—on the African dynamics; the appropriateness of what 
was perceived as a largely urban concept to a predominantly rural Africa; and 
theoretical scepticism regarding the soundness of any differentiation at the 
national level between state and civil society in Africa.4  A decade later, the CSI 
findings indicate a normalisation as this debate has now given way to a general 
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acceptance of civil society as an integral part of the conceptual, policy and 
institutional landscape of African countries. Indee the lack of   contestation in 
the four countries on the appropriateness or relevance of the CSI’s definition of 
civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where 
people associate to advance common interests (CIVICUS, 2006), is itself a much 
needed acknowledgment of the normalisation of the debates about the 
conceptual relevance of civil society to Africa.  What emerges is not only an 
acceptance of the concept, but a similarity in the historical trajectory and 
evolution of civil society in Africa, as well as a consensus that the organisational 
implications of the CSI’s definition-- that is,  the forces  addressed such as trade 
unions, women associations, youth and intellectuals-- have existed in Africa. To 
the extent that differences emerged in the four countries, these were related to 
issues of composition---not conceptual relevance---of civil society in Africa. 
These discussions, more so, were related to the incorporation or otherwise of 
political parties (Sierra Leone) and traditional authorities (Togo and Ghana) into 
the ambit of civil society, as well as the purpose f civil society (Uganda).5    
 
Apart from these questions related to composition ad purpose, the 
historiography of civil society in the four countries, remains largely the same 
and characterised by four phases. In Phase 1, the precolonial era, civil society 
consisted of community institutions made up of largely self help and solidarity 
groups whose primary objective was to cultivate solidarity among members, 
promote the development of groups of individuals settled in the same area or 
originating from the same region. Phase 2, the colonial period characterised by 
rapid urbanisation due to mass migration to the citi s, led to the development to 
largely ethnic groupings that serviced and responded to the needs of the different 
ethnic communities in the urban areas. The evolution of the formal CSO sector 
in Africa also has its roots in this era, as this period saw the emergence of more 
formal, cross cutting and to some extent class based organisations whose 
political mobilisation was critical to the success of the nationalist struggles for 
independence in Africa. The post independence years, phase 3, consisted of the 
period of independence to the 1980s and was characterised by a constriction of 
the political space for autonomous civil society action first by nationalist leaders 
like Nkrumah of Ghana, Obote of Uganda, Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone who 
co-opted civil society into one party states for the purposes of creating a united 
front for national development. This was followed by military dictatorships, e.g., 
Amin of Uganda and Eyadema of Togo that further constrained the sphere of 
civil society, this time to destroy alternative centers of power to their (mis) rule.  
 
The period from the 1980s to present marked a turning point in the development 
of the CSOs in Africa.  This period, in particular the 1980s which came to be 
described as the NGO Decade in African development saw the “NGOization” of 
civil society in Africa with donor support resulting in a historically unparalleled 
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growth of   NGOs in response to the African development crisis, as well as the 
availability of donor resources6. In addition the political liberalisation of the 
1990s also opened a new chapter in the evolution of civil society in Africa, as it 
further opened and legitimised the civil society sphere. Specifically, the 
democratisation process of the late 1980s and 1990s  per se legitimised and 
liberated civil society as an autonomous arena independent  of state control, 
allowing the re(emergence) and strengthening of other forms of CSOs (trade 
unions, student movements, women’s groups etc.). In addition, as part of this 
process civil society in Africa was particularly targeted for strengthening as the 
building of civil was regarded as essential to the consolidation of the fragile 
democratic process7 . Taken together, these developments have ensured that in 
all the countries; Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda---and indeed in the 
whole of Africa---civil society is no longer a contes ed conceptual category, but 
a reality sui generis, engaged in a web of relations that are cross cutting with a 
diverse set of actors, and contributing to the discourse and practice of African 
development. Not only is civil society a visible reality, but compared to the 
other institutional actors---the state and the private sector---civil society retains 
overwhelming positive support among the population of Africa. 
 
This clearing of the conceptual space thus provides th  impetus to address the 
more substantive issues associated with the state of civil society. That is, while it 
might no longer be a contested concept in Africa, the contours of civil society, 
its organisational characteristics, contributions and challenges nevertheless 
remain largely unknown, in part because of a lack of sustained and systematic 
analyses. .   
 
 
III. CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA: THE CSI RESULTS 
The CIVICUS civil society index (CSI) thus provides a much needed impetus 
and tool to gauge the state of civil society. The CSI seeks to achieve this in the 
context of assessment of four dimensions seen as necessary for a comprehensive 
understanding of the state of civil society: structure, environment, values and 
impact.  In the following the results of the CSI to  assessing the state of civil 
society in Africa is presented, and their implications discussed.  
 
 
III(a). The Structure of Civil Society in Africa      
The structure dimension is an assessment of civil society’s make-up, size and 
composition. Concretely it assesses the specific actors within civil society, the 
characteristics and relationships both to other civil society actors and other 
institutional actors including the state, the private sector and society in general 
(CIVICUS, 2006). In effect the structure consists of the human and financial 
resource environment for civil society, and combines issues of civic 
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participation, donor dependency and competition within CS.  It is composed of 6 
sub-dimensions: breadth of citizen’s participation; depth of participation; 
diversity; organizational capacity; interrelations; and resources (and 19 
individual indicators).  
  
 GHANA S. LEONE TOGO UGANDA TOTAL 
STRUCTURE 1.5 1.3 1 1.8 1.4 
- Breadth of citizen participation 2 1.8 1.2 2.6 1,9 
- Depth of citizen participation 2 1.3 2 1.7 1,8 
- Diversity of CS participants 1 1 1.3 2 1,3 
- Level of organisation 1 1 1 1.6 1,2 
- Inter-relations 1.5 1.5 0.5 1.5 1,3 
– Resources 1.3 1 0 1.5 0,95 
 
With a cumulative average of 1.4, the CSI indicates that the structure of civil 
society in Africa remains relatively weak, although Uganda (1.8) and to a lesser 
extent Ghana (1.5) show moderate strength (see figure XXX). The strength of 
civil society at this level lies in the extent of civil society participation, itself a 
reflection of traditional practices in what remains largely agrarian and rural 
based countries, and where participation in socially inclusive self help 
organisations is rampant.  
 
Although membership and volunteering in civil society remain strong, this does 
not translate into substantive financial support, as what citizens give to CSOs 
remain insignificant in the four countries. In part this can be explained by the 
pervasive poverty that characterise the four countries, as well as the continuous 
support of donors for civil society in Africa.  Indeed the CSI findings indicate a 
CSO structure characterised by inadequate resources, financial and human on 
the one hand,  and on the other hand, the extent to which donor support 
determines the resources available to CSOs in all the four countries. Thus 
Uganda, which has been a donor favourite since the la e 1980s, scores 2.0 with 
over 25% of all official aid said to be going to NGOs, who sometimes have a 
high dependency rate of over 80%. In Togo on the otr hand, where donors--in 
particular the EU, the largest single donor to Togo-- suspended their aid in the 
1990s due to the political crisis, CSOs hardly have ny support at all.    
 
The level of organisation is also a weak part of the structure of civil society in 
Africa. Although there is the emergence of networks in all the four countries, 
with those in Uganda in particular relatively well resourced, these tend to be 
located in the capital city, with very little active support from the membership. 
The weakness of these networks finds its most concrete expression in the 
inability to establish a self regulatory code for CSOs, particularly in Ghana and 
Uganda.  The case of the Draft National Policy for Strategic Partnership with 
NGOs in Ghana is indicative of this weakness (see page 40 of Ghana’s report). 
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Developed through one of the most consultative processes in the country under 
the sponsorship of external donors led by the Charities Aid Foundation, the 
central focus of this Policy is the formation of the National Commission of 
NGOs (NCNGO), which aims to promote the development of a code of conduct 
for NGOs by the NGOs themselves to strengthen self-regulation. Despite the 
progressive elements of the policy, since 2001 it has been left unimplemented by 
government unwillingness, as well as the lack of follow up capacity by CSOs in  
Ghana, to put pressure on  the Ghanaian government to implement the policy.  
Similarly in Uganda, under donor pressure and sponsorship, CSOs have recently 
developed A Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism for NGOs active in 
Uganda, which is yet to be implemented (Uganda report). 
 
The general structural weakness and lack of active participation in networks also 
translates into low levels of interrelations between CSOs. Rather than 
cooperation, communication and the sharing of information, what emerges from 
the CSI is a culture of competition for the same donor support. In this instance 
the conclusions of the Sierra Leone study equally ho ds true for Ghana, Uganda, 
and Togo:  
 
Despite the proliferation of CSOs, communication and networking between 
and among CSOs in Sierra Leone are considerably low. CSOs tend to isolate 
themselves from each other, and do not have a common platform for sharing 
information and building networks…for fear of resource competition and 
access to donor agencies8. 
 
Overall, the structure that emerges is a civil society arena whose organisations 
are gradually emerging in the context of an over centralised state that, 
historically, has sought to restrict the space for civil society.  Yet the 
organisations that inhabit this sphere remain fragile due to weak organisation 
and poor resources; fragmentation along a rural-urban divide; and  internal 
weaknesses due to an unhealthy competition resulting in a major part from the 
sole dependence on donors.  The implication of this structure for the future of 
CSOs in Africa is explored in section IV. 
 
 
III(b). Civil Society in Africa: Environment    
While structure is internal to civil society, the environment dimension of the 
state of civil society relates to the external context including variables such as 
the political, legal, institutional, social, cultural and economic factors, as well as 
the attitudes and behaviour of state and private sector actors towards civil 
society.  In the African context, the political context is particularly important to 
understanding the state of civil society given that t e parameters within which 
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civil society and NGOs [in Africa] can operate are d fined by the regime in 
power (Dicklitch 1998:169).  
 
 GHANA S. LEONE TOGO UGANDA TOTAL 
ENVIRONMENT  1.5 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.1 
- Political context 1.5 0.7 0.7 1 0,975 
- Basic freedoms and rights 1.7 0.7 1 1.3 1,175 
- Socio-economic context 1 0 0 1 0,5 
- Socio-cultural context 2.3 1.7 1 1.7 1,675 
- Legal environment 1.3 1 1 1.3 1,15 
- State-civil society relations 1.7 1 0.7 1.7 1,275 
- Private sector-CS relations 1 0.3 0.7 1.7 0,925 
 
With a cumulative average of 1.1, the environment in which civil society y 
operates in Africa is the weakest of all the dimensio  in the CSI findings.  
Concretely this mean that the environment within which civil society operates is 
at best disabling, and at worst, hostile for the opration of civil society.  This 
environment is characterised by weak socio-economic development, fragile 
democracies, and is reflective of the general state of  Africa. This general 
situation is further exacerbated by prevailing incidence of corruption in all these 
four countries surveyed, as well as the individual economic and political history 
of the four countries, with all emerging from major c isis and political 
instability. For instance Sierra Leone is just emerging from a brutal civil war, 
Uganda sill reeling form an ongoing insurgence in the North of the country a 
heavy toll on human and economic infrastructure, and Togo having just emerged 
from a long drawn political crisis, which as stated earlier, led to a suspension of 
international aid, with debilitating effects on the economy.  
 
Politically, all these countries have witnessed a transition to democratic rule, 
resulting in a constitutionalization of basic freedoms and rights, including 
political rights and rights of association. These political transitions however 
remain fragile to varying effects, with Togo and Sierra Leone the most fragile. 
Ghana remains the most stable having established competitive multiparty 
environment since 1992.   
 
This CSI assessment indicates that with the active support and pressure from 
donors, there are signs of a general reconstitution of state-civil society relations 
from one of state dominance of African political and economic life to a 
pluralistic form that include the participation of civil society.  In Uganda this is 
exemplified by the growing use of CSOs as implementing agencies for 
government programmes. This restructuring  is also reflected at the legal and 
administrative level. In general the legal and administrative procedures, while  
discretionary, cumbersome, and to some exrtent inadequate to respond to the 
growth of CSOs, it is not restrictive. The exception s Uganda where a proposed 
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legislation, if implemented, has  potential to tighen the legal environment with 
restrictive implications for civil society.  
 
The relative thaw in state-civil society relations is however not reflected in 
CSO-Private sector relations. In general private sector support for CSOs is very 
minimal at best (Togo), and non-existent in the other countries.   In part this can 
be explained by the fragility of the corporate sector, which itself is under 
developed in  these four countries, as well as the dependence of CSOs on 
external donors, which might explain the reluctance of corporations to finance 
CSOs activities.   
   
In sum, emerging from the CSI study in the four African countries is an 
environment that, while not overly hostile, is somewhat disabling for civil 
society. Given the crucial role of the environment for civil society health, the 
importance of action at this level becomes crucial to any attempt at building 
civil society9. The practical implications of this challenge are explored in section 
IV. 
 
 
III(c). Civil Society in Africa: Values    
The values dimension addresses the principles and vlues adhered to, practised 
by and promoted by civil society (CIVICUS, 2006).  This dimension is 
particularly relevant in the light of a civil society debate in Africa in which civil 
society is expected to contribute to the promotion of positive, progressive and 
democratic values. Consequently, an assessment of this level is also a measure 
of the extent to which civil society lives out its promise in practice. 
 
 GHANA S. LEONE TOGO UGANDA TOTAL 
VALUES 2 1.5 1.4 1.9 1,7 
– Democracy 2.5 2 0.5 1.5 1,625 
– Transparency 2 1.3 1 1.7 1,5 
– Tolerance 2 1 1.5 1.5 1,5 
- Non-violence 1.5 2 1.5 2 1,75 
- Gender equity 1.3 1.3 1 1.7 1,325 
- Poverty eradication 3 2 2 3 2,5 
-Environmental sustainability 2 1 2 2 1,75 
 
The CSI study confirms the sphere of civil society to be one in which 
progressive values are promoted by CSOs in Africa. With a cumulative average 
of 1.7, the values dimensions represent a more than average, in fact the highest 
score for African countries. In the four Africa countries surveyed: Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, Togo and Uganda, civil society turns out positively as a contributor to 
positive values. If the relevance of civil society is limited to the extent to which 
it responds to pressing problems in the societies in which it is a part of, civil 
society in Africa can certainly be regarded as an important and significant actor 
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as it does respond satisfactorily to one of the major challenges in Africa, that of 
poverty alleviation.  With an average of 2.5, with Uganda and Ghana scoring the 
maximum 3, civil society promotion of values related to poverty alleviation is 
firmly established.   
 
This development can be explained in part by the fact that this is the traditional 
focus of CSOs in Africa.  It is possible, however, to also see this high 
preponderance of the values of poverty reduction as an internalisation of the 
dominant values espoused by donors, who finance CSOs and their activities in 
Africa.       
 
While civil society is good at promoting progressive alues, the same cannot be 
said of the practice of the values, as increasingly concerns are being raised abut 
the extent to which civil society in Africa practices the very values it promotes. 
Indeed the CSI findings indicate that civil society in Africa reflects some of the 
negative and destructive values that undermine African development. These 
include the lack of   internal democracy and transprency; instances of 
corruption to a gap between the rhetoric and practice of values of ‘tolerance’, 
non-violence and gender equity. The exclusivist andelitist tendencies reflected 
in the structure affects the image of CSOs as promoters of progressive values, as 
the findings from Togo---which resonates with the findings from Ghana, 
Uganda, Sierra Leone---indicates:   
 
 CSOs are elitist (composed of the elite and intellectuals) organizations based 
in the capital city and maintaining regular work relations with the State 
Administration’s technical services and development par ners…   Thus, social 
groups such as rural actors, poor people and minorities with no access to these 
elitist groups are not represented and do not participa e in the leadership of 
these CSOs10  
 
To be sure, these concerns do not define the totality of the discussions on CSOs 
and their values in Africa. In fact, despite these concerns, CSOs in Africa still 
emerge as the most trusted institutional actors—compared to the state and the 
private sector. Nonetheless, and as is discussed in detail in section four, for an 
institutional sector whose legitimacy rests on public perceptions and attitudes, 
civil society in Africa will have to address these concerns---even if they are 
perceptions.   
 
 
III(d). Civil Society in Africa: Impact 
The normative expectation in the African development discourse is that through 
its activities, civil society will contribute to the myriad of problems confronting 
African countries. These relates in part to the extent o which they respond to 
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meeting societal needs, influencing the nature of policy, and holding the other 
two institutional actors—the state and the private sector-- to account. In general 
two sets of views have tended to prevail in regard to civil society roles and 
relations with states in Africa. In the first view, civil society is conceptualized, 
essentially, as the realm of opposition to the state, nd an antidote to the 
perennial problem of dictatorship in Africa. In this conception, collaboration 
with the state is an aberration and a sell out, ultimately undermining the raison 
d’etre of civil society 11 . The second view conceptualizes civil society’s roles 
and relations to the state in collaborative terms. Specifically, civil society 
engages the state collaboratively to legitimize thepublic realm in order to 
establish a democratic culture, build state capacity for democratic governance, 
and partner with the state in service delivery.  What roles have civil society 
played in Africa, and how has it engaged the state in the performance of these 
roles?   
 
 GHANA S. LEONE TOGO UGANDA TOTAL 
IMPACT  2 1.6 0.8 2.3 1,7  
- Influencing public policy 2.3 1.3 0.3 2 1,5 
- Holding state and private 
corporations accountable 
1.2 1.5 0 1.5 1,1 
- Responding to social interests 2 1.5 0.5 3 1,8 
- Empowering citizens 2 1.8 1.8 2.2 1,95 
- Meeting societal needs 2.3 2 1.3 2.7 2,1  
 
The CSI results indicate an overall impact of 1.7, indicating that civil society in 
Africa makes modest contributions to society, including empowering citizens 
and meeting societal needs.  The findings from Uganda and Ghana, both of 
whom have enjoyed relative long periods of consistent donor support, indicate a 
gradual scaling up of civil society to also include policy influence. Through 
donor induced macro level policy processes like the SAPRI and PRSP, CSOs 
have become integral parts of development policy frameworks and processes 
that hitherto were limited to state actors in these two countries.  But participation 
in policy processes and discussions per se does not indicate impact as effective 
civil society participation in policy must rest on   resource availability as well as 
expert knowledge of specific policy issues. Concretely his implies that civil 
society organisations must have the requisite financial resources, as well as the 
expertise and competence in the policy under discussion. Given the CSI findings 
of such a lack of capacity in these countries, it is little wonder the impact is 
modest.  The results in Togo (0.3) and Sierra Leone (1.3) indicate that CSOs in 
these two countries hardly make any impact on policy, in part because of the 
instability in these two countries.  
 
The weakest level of impact is at the level of holding the state and the private 
sector to account indicating that the liberal conception of civil society as a 
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bulwark to the state hardly finds support in Uganda, Ghana, Sierra Leone or 
Togo. To be sure in Ghana and Uganda in particular there are signs of some 
resistance to state policies, as with the water privatisation in Ghana, and the 
questioning of human rights abuses in Uganda. But compared to its service 
delivery roles, the extent to which civil society is willing and able to hold the 
state and the corporate sector to account is very limited, with civil society in 
Togo (0) making no contribution to this role.  .  
 
While civil society in Africa is weak in its engagem nt in policy, and the extent 
to which it engages the private sector, it plays major roles in service delivery 
and citizen empowerment. In deed in the context of states whose reach is limited 
throughout the country, and in other instances where the state has simply been 
too weak and unable to play its developmental roles. Even where the state and 
CSOs play the same roles, an interesting finding from the CSI public opinion 
surveys is that respondents see CSOs has being more effective than the state in 
helping the poor: Ghana 79%, SL 87% and Uganda 71%.   
 
Overall, two major conclusions emerge, namely i)  acivil society that  
increasingly provides much needed services to the poor, but plays limited roles 
in policy making, and ii) the extent of donor influence on the evolution of civil 
society and its roles, particularly in policy making. In the case of aid induced 
policy frameworks like the PRSPs, which mandate the participation of civil 
society in policy making, there is a visible civil society presence.  On the other 
hand, in areas of policy advocacy where donor policies do not mandate, civil 
society actors in these countries hardly play any meaningful roles.  The 
implications of this for the future role(s) of civil society are explored next.   
  
 
IV. WHITHER CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA?  EMERGING 
CHALLENGES 
These findings present a number challenges for civil society in Africa. These 
challenges, more so, relate to four dimensions: structu e, environment, values 
and impact. These respectively relate to issues of ustainability, partnership, 
legitimacy and relevance. 
 
 
IV(a). The Challenge of Sustainability   
As the four countries indicate, and which resonates with similar studies, civil 
society in Africa remains weak and fragile. This weakness is characterised in 
part by a lack of financial resources, weak apex organisations, and a 
concentration of resources on a few CSOs predominantly located in the urban 
areas.  This weakness is further exacerbated by the CSI findings that CSOs and 
their activities in Africa are wholly funded from ext rnal sources with few 
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domestic sources of financing.  While the CSI findings do not indicate a 
cessation of donor funding to CSOs in Africa,   a historical analysis does 
indicate that donor priorities and commitments do change. Indeed the 
suspension of aid to Togo by the European Union, and the   debilitating effects it 
has had on Togolese CSOs, attests to this danger.   Given this historical reality, 
continuous donor funding of CSOs in Africa cannot be assumed. Indeed already 
in countries, like Ghana, there is already a shift from project based funding 
where funds going directly to CSOs are now channelled through emerging 
processes like the Multi Donor Budget support (MDBS). Thus rather than 
resources being channelled directly through CSOs, they are now part of 
government programmes.  A paradox thus emerges: At the same time that there 
is  a gradual institutionalisation of CSOs and their activities in Africa, there is, 
or  ought to be a somber realization that the sustenance of CSOs and their 
activities in Africa is not guaranteed.  
 
The challenge inherent in this contradiction is at two levels, namely i) a 
diversification of funding, nurturing of local sources of funding, in particular 
developing links between civil society and the emerging private sector in Africa, 
as well as ii) negotiating with African states for statutory budgetary allocations 
for CSOs in ways that do not completely limit autonomous action by CSOs.  
The extent to which CSOs can be able to do this is directly based on 
strengthening of the capacity of the apex organisations to enable them negotiate 
for these statutory allocations for CSOs that does not compromise their 
autonomy as independent institutional actors in Africa.   
 
 
IV(b). The challenge of an Enabling Environment  
A major finding of the CSI exercise in Africa and elsewhere is the centrality of 
the context to the viability of civil society.  The political context, in particular 
the nature of the political regime, is particularly important in Africa as Susan 
Dicklitch noted nearly a decade ago:  the parameters within which civil society 
and NGOs [in Africa] can operate are defined by the regime in power12.  
Incidentally this is corroborated by findings elsewhere. For instance, in analyses 
of enabling conditions for CSOs, Bailer, Bodenstein a d Heinrich ascribe 
primacy to a country’s governance (i.e. effective and democratic institutions).13 
 
As was noted, the CSI findings indicate that compared to two decades ago, the 
political context, and with it state-civil society relations, is improving.  Yet the 
findings also indicate that this changing context and relations are mandated, in 
part, by external donors. Thus in the absence of pressure from external actors 
continuous progress is not guaranteed. Indeed therear  signs of reversal where 
there is no donor pressure and a lack of civil society resistance. For instance,  
the non implementation of the Draft NGO policy in Ghana in the absence of 
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donor pressure;  the (expected) introduction of new r strictive CSO policy in 
Uganda; the fragility and inconclusiveness of the political process in Togo, are 
all indications that progress in state-civil society rapprochement in Africa is not 
irreversible.  
 
Thus while analytically the environment is external to civil society, and to some 
extent outside its control, paradoxically it is this level that has the greatest 
impact on the state of civil society14. The challenge inherent in this paradox, is 
for civil society in sub Saharan to develop the capacity to proactively engage the 
state to shape this environment and to protect it from shrinking.  Concretely this 
means that while in the past, CSO legislation has often been introduced at the 
initiative of governments, for the future the Civil society in Africa will have to 
be proactive in advocating legislation that will facilitate its growth, and enhance 
its accountability.  In addition, it will mean contributing to the 
institutionalisation of democratic governance, necessary for improved state-
society relations, on the continent. 
 
 
IV(c). The challenge of CS Legitimacy and Accountabili y   
The CSI findings indicate concerns for CSOs in Africa to prove their legitimacy 
as independent, credible and locally embedded actors in society. Depending on 
the country, these concerns with legitimacy can be the result of the sole reliance 
on foreign funds, which leads to the perception of 'foreign' organizations; and an 
abuse of the NGO status by some organizations. To be sure, and as the CSI 
studies indicate, civil society enjoys more legitimacy in Africa compared to the 
other institutional actors—the state and the private sector. Yet in all the African 
countries surveyed and elsewhere-- the challenge of accountability remains the 
key challenge for civil society.15  
 
Issues of civil society legitimacy are in general related to issues of values and 
accountability. Thus if civil society organisations  in Africa  have a legitimacy 
problem—and the CSI findings indicate that they do have---it is not so much the 
result of over reliance on external donors, as the major institutional actors in 
Africa—the state and the private sector—all depend on donors for their 
activities.  Rather legitimacy is being undermined by the corrupt tendencies of 
the leaders of some CSOs,  lack of self-regulation, failure to adhere to an 
explicit code of ethics, and most important the lack of embeddedness in society 
characterised by a rural-urban divide and a  preponderance of elitist 
organisational behaviour.  
 
The challenge inherent in this is for CSOs to put their house in order as criticism 
of legitimacy and accountability may serve as a ration lization for governmental 
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intervention. Such house keeping, more so, requires actions at different levels 
including: 
 
• The development of self-regulatory mechanisms, as an important step in 
the process of developing their relations with the state, and establishing 
legitimacy and accountability. The Ugandan Civil Society Quality 
Assurance Certification Mechanism is a welcome development in this 
respect. But it is only a first step. The real challenge is to actually 
implement it, and if successful, its principles (good practices) appropriated 
by CSOs in other African countries.   
• Addressing Power Asymmetries through the development of horizontal 
linkages within civil society formed across the rural-urban divide, and the 
rural area incorporated more visibly in CSO activities at the national level.    
• Establishing CSO legitimacy as organizations with roots, identity and 
impact through their embeddedness--- to be achieved in the context of 
proactive linkages with communities---. in the societies within which they 
operate    
 
 
IV(d). The Challenge of Relevance  
The final challenge emerging from the CSI studies rlates to issues of CSO 
relevance.  As the findings indicate, civil society has responded significantly to 
one of the major problems of Africa:  poverty alleviation, even if this role can 
and ought to be improved. What remains is a scaling up of CSO activity to 
address the other central challenge of Africa: democratic governance. This puts 
a role for civil society that moves from poverty alleviation and service delivery 
to issues of policy making. Indeed given the centrality of issues of governance to 
the resolution of Africa’s problems, until civil society is able to develop the 
capacity to form and influence the public policy environment, their long term 
relevance for the continent will be in doubt. Incidentally this is one area in 
which the CSI findings indicate civil society is weak in Africa.  
 
The challenge of CSO involvement in policy should also involve a scaling up of 
civil society activity beyond the nation state to issues of continental governance. 
This is because of growing indication that   regional i tegration may potentially 
hold out the most important opportunity for improving political accountability 
across the continent, and in fact that some of the internal political contradictions 
— especially within some of the smaller landlocked countries within Africa — 
will only be resolved when these nations become intgral parts of larger 
entities.16   The need for CSO policy activity at the continental level is further 
strengthened by the increasing importance and use of r gional institutions, in 
particular the African Union and NEPAD, as instruments to establish a culture 
of democratic governance on the continent, and the realisation that the 
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democratic governance aspirations of the AU and NEPAD could easily stall 
without the watchdog role of civil society17.  Thus while the CSI did not directly 
address  CSO involvement in continental policy processes, given the growing 
influence of the continental level as a major arena for governance, continuous 
relevance of CSOs in Africa requires a focus on this level. A focus on the 
continental level presents challenges to CSOs at two levels, namely i) engaging 
in national level continentally inspired policy processes like the African Peer 
Review Mechanism of NEPAD that seeks to democratize governance in 
individual Africa states; and ii) creating horizontal linkages within civil society 
across national boundaries in Africa to engage in policy structures like the 
African Union’s ECOSOCC and the Pan African Parliament (PAP), that seek to 
democratize the African public sphere.   
 
How civil society responds to this challenge becomes critical for its ability to 
maintain relevance in Africa, as well as securing a stable political and economic 
environment conducive to its development. The practic l operational 
implications relates to the need to strengthen horizontal civil society linkages 
across national boundaries in Africa,  as well as a familiarization with the 
political development at the political levels, familiarization and engagement 
with  the institutions of regional governance, in particular the structures of the 
AU and NEPAD 18.   
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the evidence indicates that civil society has (re)emerged as a significant 
autonomous space and institutional actor in Africa, engaged in a web of 
crosscutting relations, and   contributing in varying ways to the continent’s 
development. To be sure, Africa is diverse with varying political and socio 
economic contexts.   This diversity has since accentuated and should be 
reflected in the understanding of, and strategies for civil society development in 
Africa. Yet, despite the varying contexts, the overall state of civil society in 
Africa that emerges is a civil society that shows increasing visibility and 
relevance. However, like the overall African political and socio economic 
context in which they exist and are part of, civil society remains fragile, and its 
continuous development must be constantly nurtured and facilitated.  Its roles, 
more so are concentrated on service delivery, with very little involvement in 
policy making.   
 
The future of civil society in Africa will thus depnd on two distinct but 
interconnected processes, namely i) improvements in he external environment 
in which it operates---in particular the political context ---and ii) second, and 
most important, the extent to which civil society in Africa itself manages the 
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internal challenges facing it. This challenge is aptly captured by the concluding 
questions posed by the Ugandan study:   
 
Will it [civil society] confine itself to a somewhat docile role, focusing on 
service delivery and sub-contracting from government? Or will it further 
develop its capacity to question the socio-political make-up, striving to 
augment its autonomy, its sense of independent idenity, its cohesion and its 
local ownership?19  
 
Given the importance of civil society to the future of the continent, these are 
questions that ought to be answered not by civil society alone. To the contrary 
these questions can and ought to be answered also by all with a stake and 
interest in the development of civil society, but the continent in general. Indeed, 
an adequate response might well enable civil society in Africa emerge as a 
critical arena whose institutional actors and organis tions make significant 
contributions to the search for a new beginning for Africa--- a search dubbed the 
“the African renaissance” and reflected by a desire fo  a continent characterised 
by democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and ultimately a 
better life for all Africans. 
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